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#.  INTRODUCTION 
The BITKOM (German Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications 
and New Media) forecasts a serious lack of IT experts on the German labour market in 
the upcoming years.  Despite the recession caused through the financial crisis, they 
predict  around  ##,000  vacancies,  especially  in  the  field  of  software  development 
(Scheer, 2008). One instrument to overcome the expected shortage is the deployment 
of  experts  from  abroad  through  IT-offshoring.  Before  the  turn  of  the  century,  the 
shortage of IT experts on the German labour market was already a main reason for 
German companies to offshore software development (Moczadlo, 2003).  Therefore, it 
is necessary that companies have a clear understanding about the chances and risks of 
IT offshoring. In this article, the expectations of companies with no experience in IT 
offshoring with the evaluations of experienced companies are compared. 
International organizations like UNCTAD (2004), OECD (2004) and EU (2003) as 
well as the press reported intensively on offshoring. The public interest in this topic 
increased exceedingly during the last couple of years (Maskell et al., 2006, p.#). 
The UNCTAD (2004, p. #47) evaluated offshoring of services as a global shift which 
offers large benefits for the involved countries because the receiving countries gain 
jobs, know-how and access to foreign markets, the sending countries improve their 
competitiveness and are enabled to move into higher  value activities. On the other 
hand,  within  the  sending  countries  the  dangers  of  job  losses  and  lower  wages  are 
discussed vehemently in nearly all parts of the society (Mankiw, 2006, pp. 4; Trefler, 
2005, pp. 9; Bhagwati, Panagariya, Srinivasan 2004, pp.97).  
Despite this popularity, the definition of offshoring varies. This study follows the WTO 
(2005, p. 267) which define offshoring by using the criteria location and control. Non-
captive offshoring or contracting out refers to the case when the supplier is a non-
affiliated  firm  and  located  abroad.  Captive  offshoring  describes  sourcing  from  an 
affiliated company abroad. 
The  main  motivation  for  companies  to  offshore  services  is  to  increase  the 
competitiveness through cost savings and getting access to specialized skills. Through 
production and sourcing abroad companies can profit from the low labour costs for 
highly skilled personnel - especially in emerging markets. Internet and the worldwide 
availability  of  telecommunication  networks  for  competitive  prices  facilitate  the 
relocation of IT services. Also in Germany, one can observe this trend for several years 
now. The numbers of IT offshoring projects in Germany are rising (Broß, 2005, p.8). 29




The  BITKOM  together  with  the  BDI  (Federation  of  German  Industries)  state  for 
companies the decision is often not whether but how to do it (Kirchhof, 2006, p.8).  
On the other hand, IT-Offshoring, which crosses national and cultural boarders, is a 
very  complex  arrangement  regarding  the  planning,  steering  and  controlling  of 
processes  as  well  as  the  intense  communication  and  cooperation  with  vendors  or 
employees abroad. Therefore, it is not astonishing that many companies made negative 
experiences with it. Aron and Singh (2005, p. #36) states referring to empirical studies 
“half  the  organizations  that  shift  processes  offshore  fail  to  generate  the  expected 
financial benefits.”  
2.   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
For  IT  offshoring,  one  can  consider  several  theoretical  approaches.  The  traditional 
trade theory shows that the factor price differences are decisive for the international 
division of labour. Companies therefore  will produce through captive offshoring or 
source  in  those  countries  where  they  find  relative  factor  price  advantages  for  a 
comparable output. 
2.# Core competencies  
The core competencies approach is one of the theoretical approaches that assist by the 
decision what kind of activities one can cut out of the value chain and hand them over 
to a foreign vendor. All activities belonging to the core competencies of a company 
should be performed in-house; non-core activities  should be outsourced to the best 
supplier, if they are not necessary to protect competitive advantages (Quinn, #992, pp. 
3). For Lacity and Willcocks (2003, p. ##7) this distinction alone is not very useful 
because one needs assessment tools to identify exactly what is core and non-core. For 
the determination of core competences, a combination of the resource-based theory 
with  Porters’  Strategic  Positioning  Framework  (SPF)  can  be  used  (Porter,  #98#; 
Gewald, Lamers, 2005; p. 2; Mahoney, Pandian, #992, pp. 363). In the resource-based 
theory competitive core competences results from superior capabilities and resources. 
These resources consist of tangible and intangible assets (Halawi, Aronson, McCarthy, 
2005, p. 78) which increase efficiency and effectiveness. Superior competences might 
also be developed or strengthened through the integration of unique skills (Prahalad, 
Hamel, #990; Hamel, #994).  
2.2 Transaction costs 
The transaction cost approach is recommended mostly to decide about make-or-buy, at 
home or abroad for activities which on principle could be offshored as well as for the 
controlling of the offshoring process and of the supplier’s performance (e.g. Trefler, 
2005, p. 2#; Roztocki and Fjermestad, 2005).  
Two cost components, production costs and extra costs for the transaction itself (e.g. 
information,  coordination  and  control)  are  decisive.  Through  economies  of  scale 
market solutions can reduce production costs (Vining, Globerman, #999, p. 645).  
The transaction cost theory as well as the principal agent theory are based on 




uncertainty of the future in the sense of unforeseeable developments like technique, 
market progress, or the behavioural uncertainty due to information asymmetry between 
the involved partners. Opportunism can occur; this  means that contractual partners, 
who may have divergent goals, try to reach their own aims at the expense of their 
counterparts.  They  follow  their  self-interests.  The  vendor  for  instance  can  provide 
insufficient or manipulated information (Williamson, #975, pp. 3#–33). 
Asset  specificity  is  the  degree  of  alternative  uses  of  an  asset  without  losing 
productivity. Idiosyncratic transactions have a high specificity (Williamson, #979, p. 
#48). It is a common view that transactions with high asset specificity, high uncertainty 
or  high  frequency  one  should  carry  out  inhouse  while  other  activities  should  be 
outsourced (Willcocks, Lacity, Cullen, 2006, p. #4).  
The hazard of opportunistic behaviour rises if only a few suppliers are able or willing 
to contract. High asset specificity also increases the switching costs. For Hancox and 
Hackney  (#999,  p.4)  these  reasons  may  explain  the  fact  that  extreme  vertical 
integration  and  spot  market  transactions  are  rare  in  IT  outsourcing,  but  a  range  of 
sourcing options can be found. 
All the mentioned aspects of transaction cost economies one can find in offshoring 
software development. The activities are normally complex and the requirements are 
not complete in all aspects. Uncertainty increases in comparison to local outsourcing 
with the cultural and geographical distance of the partners involved.  
The transaction costs for the offshoring of software development include the costs of 
negotiating the contract, the negotiating costs for change requests, the monitoring costs 
during the carrying out of the development and the cost disputes if the partners do not 
agree on escalation rules or if they do not follow them. Transaction costs can also occur 
from  the  partnership  itself.  In  the  future,  parts  of  the  contract  may  not  cover  the 
changed  expectations  and  needs  concerning  costs,  performance  and  metrics  (Ross, 
Westerman, 2003, p. 3 f.).  
Also in the case of captive offshoring, opportunism can occur by bargaining within 
organizations  for  example  over  wages,  bonuses  or  internal  transfer  prices  (Vining, 
Globerman, #999, p. 649).  
To be able to apply the transaction cost approach it is crucial to calculate all costs 
thereby  incurred.  Roztocki  and  Fjermestad  (2005,  pp.  2-3)  point  out  that  several 
companies calculate and control their offshore activities just with overhead based on 
direct labor costs. Executives are forced to guess the costs of their value chain and may 
overestimate the true cost of in-house operations while offshoring add substantially 
coordination  and  legal  costs.  For  Kern,  Willcocks  and  van  Heck  (2002,  p.  5#)  the 
difficulties in calculating IT projects occur because of the wide variety of activities, 
skills, and technologies IT projects include. The inherent intangibles make it difficult to 
assess  or  account  the  costs  and  impacts  particularly  in  IT  development  projects. 
Furthermore, they argue that in-house IT evaluation has an indifferent track record and 
this might make comparisons of in-house against supplier bids difficult. At least the ex 
post evaluation of the suppliers performance should be calculated on an appropriate 
basis. In the empirical analysis, therefore the question was asked how the calculation to 
compare offshoring and inhouse development is carried through.  29




2.3 Principal agency theory 
The  principle  agent  theory  applied  on  offshoring  focus  on  the  relation  between 
customers and vendors or between headquarters and affiliates. It is based on similar 
argumentations as the transaction cost theory: uncertainty, self-interest and bounded 
rationality (Hancox, Hackney.#999, pp. 5).  
One  can  find  several  increments  of  the  principal  agent  theory  in  literature.  Their 
objectives are structured in two main topics: how can contracts be built to improve the 
hidden actions of the agent and relationship focussed approaches. The latter discuss 
how the kind of relationship may influence the results of offshoring. This is discussed 
contrarily.  
Because of the uncertainty of the future and because of bounded rationality contracts 
for complex activities are always incomplete. For this reason, contracts are not self-
enforcing and opportunistic behaviour can have a negative impact on the achievement 
of the goals of the customer. In case of conflicts, a court ordering is limited because of 
the  nonverifiability  of  complex  activities.  Transaction-specific  investments  (asset 
specificity) establish a bilateral dependency (Williamson, 2002, p. 188).  
The focus lies on the delegation of activities from the principal to an agent; irrespective 
whether both partners are in different or in the same organisation. Both, employees and 
vendors in principle have two different businesses: output production and asset value 
enhancement. Normally, only the output can be assessed through the principal. The 
difficult-to-describe  projects  are  typically  the  innovative  projects  that  generate  the 
highest value added (Trefler, 2005, p.6). 
Conflicts of interest result from asymmetric information and uncertainty of the future. 
Traditionally  it  is  assumed  that  the  agent  is  risk  avers  because  of  his  difficulty  to 
diversify his risks and the limitation of actions he can undertake at the same time. As 
the principal has incomplete information about the agent and his actions, the agent can 
behave in self-interest at the expense of the principal (Padilla, 2003, p.7). The design of 
the contract that regulates the expected outcome and the expected performance of the 
agent as well as the relationship between principal and agent are core elements of the 
approach. Contracts can either be behaviour- or outcome-based. In terms of pricing 
models, the principal can use either fixed price or time and material for offshoring. 
Self-interested behaviour of the agent can also occur because of hidden actions. These 
are  actions,  which  influence  the  outcome  and  performance  of  the  agent,  but  the 
principal hardly can monitor them. These situations can arise due to high monitoring 
costs for the principal or due to the lack of the principal’s expertise to evaluate the 
behaviour and the total outcome of the agent’s actions. As a solution of the imperfect 
monitoring, it is proposed to design outcome-based contracts. The hidden actions are 
measured indirectly through the results. The complicacy with this approach is that not 
all result-influencing factors lie in the responsibility of the agent (Padilla, 2003, pp. 4).  
The other topic discussed in literature focuses on the consequences of partnerships. 
Lacity and Willcocks (200#, p. 85) argue, that suppliers have to keep earning the 
business. Already in #993, Lacity and Hirschheim question the existence of strategic 
partnerships  in  a  vendor  customer  relationship.  They  argue  that  vendor  account 




increase the earnings when charging the client extra for anything that is not part of the 
contract. Kern, Willcocks and van Heck (2002) analyse for the field of outsourcing the 
so called “winners curse”, which arises when suppliers make unrealistic biddings. A 
supplier already knowing that the bid will not cover his costs takes this risk in hoping 
to be able to identify and sell services that are needed operationally but which are 
excluded from the contract. The concerns of the supplier to cover the costs can lead to 
inflexibility in the interpretation of the contract, what can also implicate an adversarial 
relationship. (Kern, Willcocks, van Heck, 2002, p. 48).  
Contrariwise Jurison (#995, pp. 240) argues that partnership can reduce the risk of a 
non-appropriate  contractual  provision.  For  Talluri  and  Narasimhan  (2004)  strategic 
relationships  with  suppliers  are  key  ingredients  to  the  success  of  a  supply  chain. 
Plambeck and Taylor (2006, p. #509) focus on the dynamic aspect of a partnership. The 
partners should evaluate the potential for future collaboration. A prospect of a future 
interaction  strengthens  the  development  of  trust  and  cooperation  whereas  an 
opportunistic behaviour would damage this perspective. Moreover, conditions and the 
relationship  develop  dynamically  so  that  actions  today  influence  the  costliness  and 
effectiveness of future actions. For Maskell et al. (2006, pp. 5) offshoring is a learning 
by doing process in which companies go through several stages from cost saving to 
sourcing for innovation. Also Gupta et al. (2006, p. ##) see a need to develop a long-
term  partnership  between  customer  and  vendor  instead  of  an  arm  length  project 
oriented relationship. They developed a model with which they show that offshoring of 
more complex and strategic projects are favourable in the course of time and  with 
longer experience. Their simulations predict that the offshoring of more strategic tasks 
leads to higher profitability and sustainability (Gupta et. al., 2006, p. 20). 
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presents and compares the results of the empirical data from German 
companies with and without experiences in offshore software development. 
3.# Methodology 
An online questionnaire was conducted in 2004/05 at Pforzheim University to analyse 
the German experiences with offshore software development. The response quota was 
8%. A total of 423 German companies answered. #36 of them have experiences with 
offshore development, 69 are planning to offshore software development within the 
next three years, 2#8 have no experiences. Mostly CIOs, CEOs or heads of software 
development departments filled in the questionnaire. It is a non-representative sample. 
The data are analysed with descriptive statistics. Comparisons between variables are 
measured through Kruskal-Wallis-H tests on the level of p & 0.05.  
3.2 Aims of offshoring companies 
It is not astonishing that the first and most important reason for IT-offshoring for nearly 
all companies is cost saving. These results were also found for other countries like e.g. 
the United States or the Netherlands (Kraemer, Dedrick, 2004, p. 3, van Gorp, 2006). 29




Other important reasons for the offshoring of software development are to overcome 
capacity  constraints,  the  fact,  that  reducing  offshoring  tasks  with  vendors  or  the 
reduction of offshoring personnel is easier than reducing IT-personnel in Germany as 
well as the aspect of acceleration the time to market and the relief of internal personnel 
at home for overtaking more challenging activities (see figure #) 
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3.4 Reasons for the non-application of IT-offshoring 
For three forth of the companies the most important reason not to apply offshoring is 
the importance of customer proximity (see figure 2). They see themselves not to be 
able to keep this proximity on a level, which is decisive for the intended quality of the 
customer relations.. Nearly the same number of companies estimates offshoring to be 
too extensive in supervision and controlling or expects communication and language 
problems on the part of the offshoring partner. The internal reasons which are crucial to 
keep the software development in the Germany are the expected communication and 
language competence of the own personnel as well as the lack of offshoring knowledge 
in the company itself. Moreover, companies see the selection process to choose an 
offshore destination and there an offshoring collaborate as too complicated and too 
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3.5 Cost advantage, quality and co-operation in offshoring 
The majority of the companies calculate a cost advantage of offshoring the software 
development of 20% and more compared with in house development (see figure 3). 
Besides  that  they  are  more  than  80%  of  them  are  content  with  the  quality  of  the 
deliverables and the competencies of their offshore vendor or their affiliate abroad. 
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3.6 Comparison of advantages 
A comparison of the advantages companies see in offshoring software development 
shows  that  the  opportunities  to  cut  costs  are  not  only  the  most  important  aim  of 
offshoring but also realized the most (see figure 4).  
On  the  second  rank  of  the  advantages  is  the  concentration  on  core  competencies, 
followed  by  the  acceleration  of  time  to  market.  In  addition,  the  majority  of  the 
companies evaluate the chance to reduce in house personnel as a main advantage of 
offshoring  software  development.  The  accesses  to  innovative  know  how  and  to 
increase quality is not a major advantage in the experience of the companies doing 
software development offshore.  
The access to innovative know how is the only advantage, which is evaluated higher by 
the companies without own experience in offshoring, whereas they underestimate the 
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3.7 Comparison of problems 
The  most  important  problems  that  occur  with  offshoring  are  intercultural 
misunderstandings, followed by language problems. Nearly half of the respondents see 
management thinking and around one-third project management as problematic fields. 
Working in different time zones, the local infrastructure and the technique are of no 
consequence.  Here,  one  can  see  clearly  that  companies  without  own  experience 
overestimate systematically the problems combined with offshoring. 29
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3.8 Comparison of risks 
Companies  without  own  experiences  overestimate  also  the  risks  in  offshoring 
systematically (see figure 6). Two third of the companies  with own experiences in 
offshoring see the higher effort for communication and coordination as a high risk, 
more than 90% of the companies without own experience evaluate in the same way. 
The majority of the companies with experience also see in unplanned costs a high risk. 
They also evaluate the impairment of in house employee attitude as very risky because 
of the fear of employees to loose the job or have to accept wage cuts. 
The other fields bearing risks are evaluated by less than have of the respondents with 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Offshore  development  is  an  instrument  for  increasing  the  competitiveness  mainly 
through cost cutting or overcoming capacity constraints. In the average companies save 
with offshoring 20% and more compared with in house development. Companies can 
access  innovative  know  how  also  on  the  home  market  in  Germany.  There  the 
advantages of offshoring nearly can be neglected.   
Most  companies  are  content  with  the  quality  of  the  deliverables  and  with  the 
competences  of  the  developers  abroad.  Difficulties  occur  from  intercultural 
misunderstandings  and  language  problems.  Also  the  management  approach  and  the 
project management have potentials for improvement. 
Clearly one can see that companies without own experience in offshore development 
underestimate the advantages of this instrument and overestimate the problems and 
risks. 
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The BITKOM (German Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications 
and New Media) forecasts a serious lack of IT experts on the German labour market in 
the  upcoming  years.    Despite  of  the  recession  because  of  the  financial  crisis  they 
predict around 11,000 vacancies, especially in the field of software development. One 
instrument to overcome the expected shortage is the deployment of experts from abroad 
through IT-offshoring. 
Based on an empirical study conducted in 2004/05 at Pforzheim University this article 
analyses  the  expectations  and  experiences  of  German  companies  with  offshore 
software  development.  The  comparison  shows  that  companies  without  direct 
experience  with  offshore  software  development  underestimate  the  opportunities  and 
overestimate the risks of this internationalization instrument.  
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